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1.  Executive Summary 
 
The Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect held a two-day workshop 
entitled ‘Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: Legacies and Prevention’ 
on 21-22 March at the University of Queensland. Attendees participated in a range 
of panels on key issues central to the workshop theme, including the legacies of 
mass violence, transitional justice, mass atrocity prevention, and specific regional 
issues. The purpose of the workshop was to initiate serious scholarly examination of 
a variety of topics surrounding the legacies and the prevention of genocide and mass 
atrocities in the Asia-Pacific region.  The workshop was structured around four key 
areas of enquiry: 
 The legacy of mass violence in Indonesia and East Timor 
 Transitional Justice after mass atrocities 
 Early warning and prevention of genocide and mass atrocities in the Asia-
Pacific 
 The United Nations, sovereignty and international intervention in mass 
atrocity crimes 
The keynote speaker for the workshop was Professor Alex Hinton, Executive 
Director, Center for the Study of Genocide, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights, 
Professor of Anthropology and Global Affairs, Rutgers University (New Jersey).  In 
conjunction with the workshop was the launch of the exhibition Lessons from 
Rwanda: The United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide.  This exhibition, from 
the United Nations Department of Public Information, was on display for the first 











The twentieth century has been labelled the ‘century of genocide’.  According to 
some estimates, more than 250 million civilians were victims of genocide and mass 
atrocities during this period.  The Asia-Pacific region has not been immune.  
Genocide and mass atrocities have occurred in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 
1971, Indonesia (1965-66), Cambodia (1975-79) and East Timor (1975-1999).  At the 
opening of the twenty-first century, efforts to halt this massive loss of innocent life 
culminated in the emergence and acceptance of the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
principle in international discourse.  More effort than ever before is being 
channelled towards preventing mass atrocities.   
 
It is perhaps surprising therefore, that there have been very few attempts to 
examine this issue at the regional level.  Regional influences can be of substantial 
impact in both dealing with the legacies of past atrocities and in endeavours to 
prevent future instances of genocide or mass atrocities.  In the Asia-Pacific in 
particular, issues surrounding sovereignty and non-intervention, the dearth of 
capacity and mandate amongst regional organisations and the wide variance in 
approaches to governance provide a unique constellation of challenges.  Many 
nations in the region are comprised of bipolar or multiethnic populations, with the 
associated challenges of maintaining national cohesion and working to avoid or limit 
ethnic cleavages.  Empirically, those struggling with the legacy of past genocides are 
also at increased risk of future events – further compounding the struggle to rebuild.   
 
This workshop was organised to bring a specific Asia-Pacific focus to the field of 
genocide prevention.  It was the first workshop dedicated to exploring the legacies of 
past genocides and mass atrocities in the Asia-Pacific and examining genocide 
prevention from this specifically regional perspective.  The workshop consisted of 
the following five panel discussions:  
 
Panel One: Mass Violence in Indonesia and East Timor 
 
Panel Two: Opportunities and Challenges for Mass Atrocity Prevention in the 
Asia-Pacific 
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Panel Three: Transnational Justice After Mass Atrocity 
 
Panel Four: Early Warning and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities 
 
Panel Five: The United Nations, Sovereignty and International Intervention in 
Mass Atrocity Crimes 
 
As part of the workshop, an Exhibition Opening, entitled Lessons from Rwanda: The 
United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide and a Public Lecture, entitled The 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A View from Critical Transitional Justice Studies were held. 
The workshop concluded with a Roundtable, which invited participants to reflect on 
the key themes of the event and to identify issues for future consideration. The 
following report presents the topics and analysis from each panel, in addition to the 
































3.  Panel One: Mass Violence in Indonesia 
and East Timor 
 
 
East Timor: The Politics of Starvation 
Clinton Fernandes  
 
About the Presenter: 
Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes is a political scientist at UNSW@ADFA.  His 
most recent publication is The Independence of East Timor: Multidimensional 
perspectives – Occupation, Resistance and International Political Activism (2011).    
 
Abstract: 
Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 and occupied it for 24 years. During that time, 
East Timor suffered perhaps the largest loss of life relative to total population since 
the Holocaust. The majority of deaths occurred between 1977 and 1979 as a result 
of a widespread famine caused by the Indonesian military’s operations. This paper 
demonstrates that early warning of the famine was available but consistently 
ignored by Indonesia and by a number of Western governments. For Indonesia, the 
military objective of destroying the resistance overrode all other considerations. For 
Western governments, the maintenance of good relations with the Suharto regime 
took priority. They deliberately refrained from proposing humanitarian aid until they 
received the go-ahead from the Indonesian military. Humanitarian aid finally arrived 
in sufficient quantities after pressure generated by a relatively small number of 
activists, primarily in the USA, Australia and Britain. The efforts of these activists not 
only ended the famine, they also led to the creation of influential, long-term support 
for East Timor’s independence among members of the US Congress and large media 
organizations.  
 
About the presentation: 
The first presenter in this panel was Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes from the 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales 
whose paper was titled ‘East Timor: The Politics of Starvation’. Associate Professor 
Fernandes began his presentation by explaining the context in which the mass 
atrocities in East Timor took place. For this purpose, he explained that Indonesia 
invaded East Timor in 1975 and occupied it for 24 years. The invasion was resisted by 
force of arms. He noted that East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and 
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Reconciliation concluded that the minimum-bound for the number of conflict-
related deaths was 102,800 (+/- 12,000), and the upper bound may have been as 
high as 183,000. He further noted that Sarah Staveteig, a demographer at the 
University of California – Berkeley, applied standard demographic methods of 
indirect estimation and found that 204,000 was a conservative upper-bound 
estimate on excess mortality. This was out of a starting population 648,000. 
However, Associate Professor Fernandes noted that, unlike the Holocaust, the 
situation in East Timor was not classified as a genocide due to the fact that the 
intentions of the Indonesian military were to suppress the resistance movement in 
East Timor, and not to destroy either in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group as such. Killings and mass violence committed for such political 
objectives are not covered under the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). 
 
As noted by Associate Professor Fernandes, during this occupation of East Timor by 
Indonesian forces, the military objective of destroying the resistance overrode all 
other considerations. He explained that this was particularly evident during the 
period 1977 – 1979, which saw an extremely large loss of life in East Timor as a result 
of the widespread famine that was caused by the Indonesian military’s 
determination to suppress the resistance movement. He asserted that only the 
Indonesian Red Cross, which was controlled by the Indonesian government, was 
given access to the country for most of this period. However, Associate Professor 
Fernandes argued that even in this instance, the food aid supplied by the Indonesian 
Red Cross failed to alleviate the widespread hunger that the famine had caused in 
East Timor, as this food aid was sold at significantly inflated prices by the Indonesian 
military to the East Timorese public for the purpose of securing profits and greater 
material power.  
 
According to Associate Professor Fernandes, a number of Western governments had 
received early warnings of the famine, but these warnings were consistently ignored. 
He asserted that the reason for this was the high priority that these governments 
gave to preserving good relations with the Suharto regime. In explaining this, 
Associate Professor Fernandes highlighted that even within the United Nations, only 
four Western states (Cyprus, Greece, Iceland and Portugal) supported East Timor in 
the General Assembly from 1976 till 1982, when the matter was delegated to the UN 
Secretary-General. Only one-third of the UN’s member states, mostly Third World or 
socialist, supported East Timor in the General Assembly. The United States, the 
United Kingdom and France acknowledged that East Timor had the right to self-
determination but did not support any General Assembly resolutions on the issue 
between 1975 and 1982. Their actions in the Security Council shielded Indonesia 
from international reaction. Fernandes explained that China and the Soviet Union 
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supported Security Council resolutions and General Assembly resolutions on the 
issue between 1975 and 1982 (with the exception of 1979 for China). 
 
According to Associate Professor Fernandes, while it was legal to listen to Timorese 
radio broadcasts in Australia, it was illegal to broadcast out of Australia without a 
licence. Fernandes explained how activists broke the law by setting up a clandestine 
radio broadcasting station. He argued that many scholars within Australia aligned 
their research priorities to fit in with the diplomatic position of the Indonesian 
government, staying clear of East Timor or actively defending the Indonesian 
occupation. This meant that even within academic circles, there was little mention of 
the situation in East Timor during this period.  
 
One of the main consequences of such responses by Western governments was that 
the general public within most Western states had very little knowledge of the dire 
situation in East Timor. Furthermore, he also noted that much needed humanitarian 
aid was not supplied. However, Associate Professor Fernandes asserted that a key 
turning point did arrive with the emergence of a relatively small number of activists, 
primarily in the United States, Britain and Australia. These groups were vital in 
generating public awareness about the situation in East Timor and ending the famine 
in the country. He also emphasized that the work of these activists had other far 
reaching consequences. For example, in the United States, these activists attracted 
the support of a leading scholar in the field of international relations, Benedict 
Anderson, which was a significant development for the movement as it legitimised 
the East Timorese cause. Professor Noam Chomsky, the pre-eminent linguist and 
political activist, worked alongside US activist, Arnold Kohen, to create a structure of 
legitimacy for the East Timorese cause. Furthermore, Associate Professor Fernandes 
noted that as a result of this structure of legitimacy, the New York Times, which had 
earlier reported that the actual death toll was not as high as claimed by activists, 
completely changed their position and became an eminent supporter of the cause. 
Associate Professor Fernandes also highlighted that the work by the activists created 
pressure for the US Congress to play a more active role in the situation in East Timor, 
and rebutted earlier statements released by Western governments that had 
downplayed the situation in East Timor. 
The presentation concluded that if it had not been for the efforts of the activists, 
little would have been done by the Western governments, which were consumed by 
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An Ongoing Legacy of Atrocity: Torture and the Indonesian State 
Annie Pohlman 
 
About the Presenter:  
Annie Pohlman is Program Leader for the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia 
at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.  Her primary research 
interests include the 1965-66 Indonesian killings, and the experiences of women 
victims of torture in Indonesia.  
 
Abstract: 
Twelve years after the end of the New Order regime (1966-1998) in Indonesia, the 
promise of reform has fallen short for the regime’s many victims of gross human 
rights abuses. The very few trials of serious offenders have been farcical, the reforms 
put in place to check the power of the military and police lack strength and political 
will, and attempts to set up a national truth and reconciliation commission have 
failed. The continuing lack of redress for past serious violations has reinforced the 
entrenched culture of impunity in Indonesia, particularly for members of the security 
sector.  One of the clearest examples of this relationship between past impunity and 
continuing atrocities in Indonesia is the use of torture by State and co-opted agents. 
Examining the use of torture by the Indonesian state over the past fifty years 
highlights the cyclical relationship between ongoing impunity for past incidents of 
serious abuses, the institutionalization of this abuse in the security sector, and the 
urgent need for redress and reform. To do this, this presentation briefly charts the 
use of torture during some of the major cases of systemic and severe human rights 
abuse during the New Order. It then describes evidence of the continuing use of 
torture by State agents over the past decade, highlighting a number of recent cases, 
and concludes by arguing for a number of avenues for redress and reform aimed at 
removing torture as a tool of state policy in Indonesia. 
 
About the Presentation: 
In introducing her paper, Ms. Pohlman acknowledged that in the twelve years since 
the fall of the Suharto regime, there have been some changes for the better in terms 
of human rights within the country. These include greater civil liberties, press 
freedoms and constitutional amendments. Despite these improvements, Ms. 
Pohlman asserted that the promise of democratisation has fallen short, and has 
often been determined by power sharing deals amongst fragmented elites, at the 
expense of democratic quality and accountability. She also noted that attempts at 
transitional justice measures in Indonesia have produced very little justice, with very 
few offenders of human rights during Suharto’s regime being tried, and those trials 
that have been conducted being completely farcical. In addition to this, Ms. Pohlman 
highlighted that the reforms put in place to check the power of the military and 
police lack strength and political will, and attempts to set up a national truth and 
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reconciliation commission have yet to succeed. Such failures at transitional justice 
have reinforced an already entrenched culture of impunity in Indonesia, particularly 
among members of the security sector. 
 
In order to analyse the strong link between impunity for past atrocities and their 
continuation today in democratizing Indonesia, Ms Pohlman provided the example 
of the use of torture by state and co-opted forces in Indonesia. She argued that 
while the use of torture by state agents in Indonesia was evident both under the 
colonial government and the Sukarno regime, the mass violence that brought the 
New Order to power in 1966 was a major contributor to the institutionalisation of 
torture as routinised practice. It was noted that from 1965 until the late 1960s, the 
army carried out a genocidal campaign against its major political rivals. During this 
period, through operational use, large portions of the security sector and their co-
opted civilian militias became increasingly more refined at the tools, tactics and 
strategies for questioning and harming victims. Ms Pohlman stated that this, in turn, 
played a vital role in the training and institutionalisation of torture as a form and 
means of policy within the security sector. 
 
Ms Pohlman asserted that there was great hope that such human rights abuses 
would be abolished after the fall of the Suharto regime and in the early years of the 
Reform. However, this has not been the case. She provided the example of the 
incident of torture of two Papupan men, Tunaliwor Kiwo and Telangga Gire, in May 
2010 by Indonesian soldiers.  It was noted that this was a unique case for three main 
reasons. Firstly, it attracted widespread international attention and outrage due to 
the fact that a video of these two men being tortured was uploaded onto the 
Internet. Furthermore, as a result of the widespread international outrage that this 
video sparked off, the military had to acknowledge that torture had taken place, and 
given that the perpetrators in the video were all wearing military uniforms, that 
soldiers had clearly been the perpetrators of the torture. Another way in which this 
case was unique is that due to further international pressure, a trial of these soldiers 
was held in January 2011, with three of the soldiers involved being sentenced to 8 – 
10 months imprisonment. However, Ms Pohlman observed that these soldiers have 
not been discharged from the military, and can return to service at the end of their 
sentence. 
 
According to Ms Pohlman, the reasons for the continued violence in Indonesia are 
threefold. The first reason is the routinisation and eventual normalisation of violence 
as means of work for portions of the military and police. Second, is the failure to set 
up competent and accountable bodies and mechanisms to prevent and investigate 
incidents of torture. Ms Pohlman stated this is clearly seen by the relationship 
between the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) and the Attorney 
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General’s Office. In 1999 and 2000, the mandate of the Komnas HAM was expanded 
to allow it to investigate cases of gross abuses, to prepare independent reports, and 
to make recommendations for prosecutions to the attorney general and even for a 
human rights court to be set up. While it can then be assumed that the case should 
then proceed to the Attorney General’s Office for investigation and sentencing, this 
has been far from the reality. Recommendations issued by Komnas HAM have 
continued to be ignored by the Attorney General, and despite overwhelming 
evidence of abuse, many cases have simply gone nowhere and perpetrators have 
been left unpunished.   
 
The third reason Ms Pohlman provided for the continued violence in Indonesia is 
that there seems to be a somewhat changed demographic amongst victims, at least 
in terms of cases reported. In expanding on this, she noted that there has been an 
increase in ‘recreational torture’ amongst the police against the socially vulnerable 
or marginalised in society. While she did note that these people have always been 
harassed and abused by the police, she highlighted that the number of cases 
reported has increased. However, she explained that this increase in reported 
abuses may be due to the improved ability of NGOs to intervene or at least report on 
these cases. Nevertheless, Ms Pohlman asserted that what can be extracted from 
this is that when torture becomes such an acceptable practice against perceived 
internal enemies, it can easily be carried out against anyone else who is seen as an 
enemy, especially when there is a lack of adequate mechanisms to hold perpetrators 
accountable.   
 
 
Panel One Question and Answer  
 
Following the presentations by Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes and Ms Annie 
Pohlman, the floor was open to questions from workshop participants. The following 
section summarises the questions and answers. 
 
Q1: The first questioned asked if the patriarchal nature of Indonesian society may be 
a possible reason for the widespread violence that was perpetrated against women 
during the New Order, and which still continues today. 
 
In response, Ms Pohlman remarked that patriarchy was, and continues to be, a 
significant factor contributing to the violence against women in Indonesia. During 
the New Order, the Suharto regime developed fictitious stories about the 
unorthodox behaviour of ‘Communist women’ in order to demonize them, and thus, 
encouraged their violent suppression by the Indonesian military. She also noted that 
the growing independence of Indonesian women has been perceived as an imminent 
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threat to the long established patriarchal nature of Indonesian society and hence, 
sexual violence has been used to re-establish this balance.  
 
Q2: The second question asked for more clarification about the steps that have been 
taken at the local level in Indonesia to challenge this culture of impunity in 
Indonesia. 
 
In response, Ms Pohlman noted that since 1998, which saw the fall of the Suharto 
regime, there has been an explosion of NGOs in Indonesia. By using the discourse of 
being victims, they have been relatively successful in getting both funding and 
sympathy. However, she emphasized there is a significant disconnect between NGOs 
working at a local level and the government, due to a lack of political will by the 
state. 
 
Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes added to this, by highlighting that while the 
tactic of protest has been legitimised following the fall of Suharto and the 
subsequent relative democratisation process that has ensued, international 
dynamics have completely out-manoeuvred local NGOs. The reason for this is that 
the international community, particularly Western states such as Australia, have 
been very involved in training the Indonesian military. However, Associate Professor 
Fernandes argued that such training has not resulted in an improvement in the 
human rights records of these former perpetrators; rather, it has merely increased 
their chances of getting promoted. Hence, he proposed that one way that the 
international community can assist these local level NGOs to challenge the culture of 
impunity in Indonesia is by providing publicity and education to local activists, while 















4.  Panel Two: Opportunities and Challenges 




Mediation in the Asia-Pacific: Constraints and Challenges 
Dale Bagshaw 
 
About the Presenter:  
Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw is Adjunct Associate Professor in the School of 
Psychology, Social Work and Social Policy at the University of South Australia.  
Associate Professor Bagshaw is the President of the Asia-Pacific Mediation Forum.  
Her most recent publication is Mediation in the Asia-Pacific: Transforming Conflicts 
and Building Peace (co-edited with Elisabeth Porter).   
 
Abstract: 
This paper focuses on the constraints and challenges faced by mediators who try to 
build culturally fluent models of mediation that are relevant to the Asia-Pacific 
context, acknowledge traditional ways of resolving conflict and also redress power 
imbalances and challenge structural inequities to ensure just outcomes for all 
involved.  Mediation is a voluntary, cooperative process wherein an impartial 
mediator controls the process and assists the parties in conflict to make their own 
decisions.  However, for mediation work, all relevant parties need to be willing to: be 
actively involved, allow the mediator to control the process, share relevant 
information and treat each other with respect. Mediation is not appropriate where 
parties in conflict hold rigid, intractable views or where the power inequity between 
the parties is so great that the mediator cannot redress the imbalance by using 
specific techniques. In some instances, mediation can be a useful approach, 
particularly in the early stages of a conflict or dispute when the mediator can assist 
the parties to manage, resolve or transform the conflict by: communicating openly 
with each other, identifying the factors contributing to the conflict, developing a 
range of possible options or solutions and engaging in principled negotiation, 
thereby preventing the conflict from escalating into violence. 
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About the Presentation:  
The first part of Associate Professor Bagshaw’s presentation focused on the history 
of mediation in the Asia Pacific, and the role that cultural and religious factors have 
played in the mediation process. Associate Professor Bagshaw noted that in the Asia 
Pacific, there has been a long standing history of informal conflict resolution 
involving intermediaries or third parties. She highlighted that some of these 
traditional practices are quite similar to Western forms of mediation where the 
parties make their own decisions, while others are more like arbitration, where a 
third party makes the decisions. For example, she noted that the informal use of 
intermediaries was found to be common in many indigenous cultures in the Asia 
Pacific region, such as the Kon Chin among Chinese and Kampong Kutu or Penghulu 
among Malays. Associate Professor Bagshaw also asserted that in many of these 
traditional or cultural mediation practices, religious principles are strongly drawn on 
in many of these traditional or customary mediation practices. For example, in 
Islamic societies, the Holy Quran is used as a manual for resolving disputes amicably, 
while the Chinese view of dispute resolution is grounded in Confucian ethical 
principles. 
 
Associate Professor Bagshaw then focused on the reasons for the increased interest 
in mediation in the Asia Pacific region. The first reason she highlighted was the 
inability of civil justice systems to deal with the increasing load of cases. Secondly, 
she noted that scarce resources such as legal aid, the rising costs of litigation and the 
need to preserve or restore ongoing relationships have all been contributing factors 
to the growing role of mediation in the Asia Pacific region. 
 
Despite the growing importance of mediation practices in the region, Associate 
Professor Bagshaw emphasized that mediation may not always be appropriate. She 
claimed that the situations where mediation is most likely to be successful is where 
continuing relationships are important, where parties in conflict are willing to 
voluntarily participate, share relevant information and allow the mediator to control 
the process. It was also noted that in order for mediation to be effective, all parties 
should have a roughly equal amount of power and are competent to negotiate, and 
parties should be willing to compromise and not hold intractable views.  
 
The presentation then focused on the importance of culture in mediation, and the 
challenges that mediators face when working cross culturally. Associate Professor 
Bagshaw drew on the work of Michelle LeBaron, who asserted that all conflicts are 
culturally based. In addition to this, she asserted that culture is vital to mediation 
practice due the fact that cultural values may determine the choice of mediators. For 
example, while an objective and impartial mediator may be prized in some cultural 
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groups or with regards to certain kinds of disputes, other cultural groups may prefer 
respected and well known elders. 
 
While culture plays a determining role in mediation practice, Associate Professor 
Bagshaw stressed that mediators must be cautious of the fact that cultures are 
consistently changing, and there are wide variations within cultures.  In further 
analysing the complex role of cultural principles in mediation, she explained that 
while individualised, direct, linear, confrontational and solution oriented approaches 
to conflict resolution tend to be promoted in most mainstream Western theoretical 
models of mediation, this may not be suitable for other non-Western cultures. For 
example, she noted that Australian indigenous communities and many other cultural 
groups and individuals in the Asia Pacific tend to value more indirect communication, 
holistic approaches, harmony and the preservation or restoration of relationships.  
 
She also emphasized that mediators seeking to work across cultures must be wary of 
the possible power imbalances that may exist between parties and which are based 
on cultural factors. However, she noted that it may be difficult to spot power 
imbalances, as they are often subtle and difficult to define. However, Associate 
Professor Bagshaw argued that if mediators are not able to identify these power 
imbalances, mediation may merely help to reproduce abuses of power by the 
dominant party, and allow for the violation of rights of the weaker party. 
 
Despite the importance of acknowledging cultural differences and sensitivities, 
Associate Professor Bagshaw contended that there still remain strong elements of 
imperialism as Western mediators and trainers try to transfer their mediation 
models to other cultures as the ‘right way’ to resolve conflict. However, she argued 
that this has actually constrained the ability to successfully mediate conflicts in many 
cases, as it may lead a process of ‘othering’, which can legitimise violence and 
construct a mythology based on inclusion and exclusion. 
 
Nevertheless, Associate Professor Bagshow noted that mediation may prove to be a 
very useful approach in solving conflicts, particularly in their early stages, when the 
mediator can assist the parties to manage, resolve or transform the conflict. 
However, to serve these means, she emphasized the importance for mediators to 
incorporate and value differences and pluralities of identity across cultures, and 
consider these issues within a framework of justice and human rights. 
 
In her concluding remarks, Associate Professor Bagshaw stressed the need to train 
culturally fluent mediators in various societies in the Asia Pacific region. She 
proposed that this cultural fluency be made a compulsory part of the mainstream 
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The Role of Stable Small States in the Responsibility to Protect  
Charles Tay 
 
About the Presenter:   
Charles Tay is currently an intern at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect.  His research on the role of stable small states in promoting the 
responsibility to protect will shortly be published as a Centre Working Paper.  
 
Abstract:  
Though much contemporary scholarship has accumulated on the means with which 
the responsibility to protect can be translated from rhetoric to practice, opinion is 
scarce on the roles particular groups of state actors can play in furthering this 
agenda.  This paper argues that there is a distinct category of small states with clear 
capacity to implement the responsibility to protect, and proposes that this category 
be identified by the fresh term – ‘stable small states’.   Definitional issues 
surrounding stable small states are considered, along with why it is in the interests of 
stable small states to play a proactive role in promoting the responsibility to protect, 
and particularly its preventive component.  Drawing on case studies from around the 
world, the paper advocates a range of strategies that are appropriate for stable small 
states to promote the responsibility to protect.  Through the adroit usage of these 
strategies, stable small states can practically transcend their conventional 
limitations, raise their impact on the global stage, and make a meaningful 
contribution to mass atrocity prevention. 
 
About the Presentation: 
Mr Tay began his presentation by identifying the main benefits for greater stable 
small state involvement in the Responsibility to Protect. Mr Tay noted the defining 
feature of stable small states is that they rank above the 75th percentile for political 
stability and absence of violence in the World Bank’s governance indicators, and 
have a population under ten million. In this sense, the two important 
characterisations of small states are size and stability. According to Mr Tay, by 
setting an upper limit for small state populations at 10 million, it includes a fair 
number of potential R2P state actors while excluding traditional R2P proponents like 
Canada and the UK. Stability is important because it reduces the chances of these 
states being potential subjects of the R2P themselves. 
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For these reasons, Mr Tay asserted that they provide significant humanitarian 
benefits and can advance the role of R2P as a moral appeal.  Furthermore, he noted 
that stable small states could provide immense strategic benefits. Firstly, it was 
noted that these states are often considered politically neutral. Moreover, stable 
small states make up 24 percent of the world’s states. Due to their sheer number, 
Mr, Tay noted that they enjoy favourably disproportionate voting capacities in 
international and transnational organisations. 
 
Following this, Mr Tay proposed four strategies through which stable small states 
can play an influential role in the Responsibility to Protect. The first strategy he 
highlighted was preventive diplomacy, which remains at the heart of the R2P. 
According to Mr Tay, stable small states are ideal for preventive diplomacy due to 
their traits of impartiality, credibility, political neutrality and policy consistency. In 
support of this argument, he provided the example of the role that Switzerland’s 
Henry Durant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue played in bringing about peace in 
Aceh in 2000. 
 
The second strategy proposed for stable small state involvement within the R2P was 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Mr Tay asserted that this could be brought 
about through several techniques. For example, stable small states could facilitate 
preventive mediation within crisis areas. Moreover, these stable small states can 
expand their domestic ADR institution capacities to encompass transnational conflict 
resolution. Finally, it was asserted that stable small states could commission 
individual expert mediators and arbitrators to facilitate preventive negotiations. In 
order to showcase the potential of stable small states, Mr Tay highlighted the 
instrumental role that Norway played in the signing of the Oslo Accords between 
Israel and the PLO between 1992 – 1993. 
 
Mr Tay also noted that a third way in which stable small states could play a greater 
role in the R2P is to use their large numbers to influence the decisions of the Security 
Council. For example, he highlighted that stable small states could influence 
resolutions from being vetoed through group formation and coalition management. 
Within this context, Mr Tay noted that even an abstention would suffice, as it was 
evident in Security Council Resolution 1593, which relates to the referral of the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC, and more recently, in Security Council Resolution 1973 
regarding the establishment of a no fly zone in Libya. He also highlighted that stable 
small states could further sway the decisions of the Security Council by leveraging 
their influence on a multinational bloc of nations, such as the G77, the 3G or the Non 
Aligned Movement. 
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The fourth strategy that Mr Tay proposed through which stable small states could 
play a greater role in the R2P was through exporting good governance. According to 
Mr Tay, this is essential as good governance mitigates the preconditions of genocides 
and mass atrocities. He then highlighted some key aspects of good governance, 
which include legal system robustness, security sector reform, and corruption 
management. Mr Tay argued that Singapore is a key example of how stable small 
states can export good governance. Through the Singapore Cooperation Programme, 
it provides an array of technical assistance to developing countries and training at a 
low cost. This includes services such public housing, public security and public 
management. 
 
Finally, Mr Tay highlighted that stable small states could play a greater role in the 
R2P through norm advocacy in the United Nations and regional organisations. One of 
the main ways through which this could be done is through framing. Mr Tay noted 
that this was evident in the 2009 General Assembly debates on the R2P, where Qatar 
appealed to the moral obligations felt by states, by arguing that welfare and security 
of individuals should be considered above politico-economic agendas. Furthermore, 
Mr Tay argued that stable small states could carry out norm advocacy by using any 
opportunities they may receive to head regional or transnational organisations. 
 
In his concluding statements, Mr Tay noted that stable small states should be 
provided an opportunity to play a greater role in the R2P as the success of this 
doctrine depends on international commitment and collaboration. Furthermore, he 
suggested that unlike certain other states, stable small states can transcend political 
limitations, and make not only rhetorical, but actual changes. 
 
Panel Two Questions and Answers 
 
Following the presentations by the two presenters, the floor was open to questions 
from workshop participants. The following section summarises the questions and 
answers. 
 
Q1. The first question was regarding a perceived disconnection with the beginning of 
Associate Professor Bagshaw’s presentation, which dealt with the importance of 
acknowledging the role of culture in mediation practice, and the end of the 
presentation, which  highlighted the prospects that mediation provided for securing 
peace and justice. 
 
In response, Associate Professor Bagshaw asserted that mediators cannot only focus 
on the notions of peace and justice within the context of the conflict, but need to 
focus on the ‘bigger picture’, which includes other factors such as culture. 




Q2. The second question asked Associate Professor Bagshaw to explain the potential 
of mediation in situations where there are risk factors of mass atrocities. 
 
Associate Professor Bagshaw replied that in such situations, the linear model of 
mediation is not applicable, as what is needed is to get the people involved to 
deconstruct the factors contributing to the conflict. Hence, she asserted that the 
question is not only the potential of mediation in mitigating mass atrocities, but also 
the skills of the mediator in understanding cultural sensitivities. Otherwise, the 
mediator could contribute to the institutionalisation of factors that contribute to the 
violence. However, Associate Professor Bagshaw also noted that the mediator 
should be mindful of certain constraints, such as legal and human rights frameworks. 
Hence, she noted that even if the goal of the mediator is to secure peace, it may be 
difficult to attain a long term agreement if there are also other legal and human 
rights issues. In such cases, she noted that short term agreements can make things 
worse, as people may feel that grievances are not being heard. Sometimes 






























About the Presenter:  
Rebecca Gidley is a former intern at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect.  In 2010, her report The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
and the Responsibility to Protect was published as a Centre Working Paper.  Later 
this year she hopes to intern at the ECCC.   
 
Abstract: 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has been in operation 
for four years with the Trial Chamber issuing a verdict in the first case in July 2010 
and a second case expected to begin trial proceedings this year. Earlier attempts at 
transitional justice, the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal and the Renakse petitions, 
were driven by political motives and despite the ECCC’s claim to independence, its 
design and operations have been fundamentally shaped by the political narrative 
that the Cambodian government wishes to see perpetuated.  In choosing a model of 
transitional justice for Cambodia in the late 1990s and early 2000s decisions were 
based not on what would be best for the Cambodian people but for the government; 
this resulted in a model strongly controlled by the Cambodian executive and with a 
strictly limited mandate. During the ECCC’s operation the government has worked to 
ensure that the defendants and the witnesses at the court are restricted, especially 
excluding any reference to the fact current members of the government are former 
members of the Khmer Rouge. In doing so, the Cambodian government has 
damaged the reputation of the ECCC as an independent judicial body, and the 
limited scope of the trails may have broader implications for the possibility of long-
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About the Presentation: 
Rebecca Gidley opened the panel with her presentation, “Political Manipulation at 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia”. Ms Gidley began by 
explaining the structure of the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC), a hybrid transitional justice system with both Cambodian and international 
participation. She explained that the majority of judges of the Court are Cambodian 
and the government has substantial control over the judiciary and the proceedings 
of the ECCC. Rules and voting regulations in the Court are complicated and attempt 
to balance the influence of the two groups of participants. The Court has undertaken 
two cases, one resulting in conviction and appeal, and a second case beginning later 
in 2011. Ms Gidley then turned to the challenges posed by the current political 
climate in Cambodia. In particular, she highlighted how the current ruling part in 
Cambodia is the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) which has held power since 1979 
when the Khmer Rouge was ousted from power. Members of the former Khmer 
Rouge who defected to the Vietnamese supported government after 1979 are 
members of the CPP and this must be considered when analysing Cambodian 
Transitional Justice.  
 
Other processes for Transitional Justice in Cambodia were mentioned in the 
presentation. One of these, The Decree Law No 1 People’s Revolutionary Tribunal 
conducted by the Vietnamese supported Cambodian government in August 1979, 
had limited legal value and suffered from a lack of due process and credible defence. 
It was focused on Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and failed to implicate others. In the 1980s a 
process was conducted similar to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission involving 
the gathering of information and public meetings, but these meetings were very 
political and did not focus on individual experiences. Instead the government used 
their control over the process in their favour, to cast themselves in a favourable light 
and to criticise the United Nations. Finally, another mechanism for transitional 
justice was negotiated in the late 1990s. In what eventually became the ECCC, it 
involved a hybrid process of joint participation between the Cambodia government 
and the UN. At the conclusion of negotiations, the Court was given the mandate to 
try ‘senior leaders and those most responsible’ for the crimes committed during the 
Khmer Rouge period, limiting the number of potential defendants. 
 
From this introduction to transitional justice in Cambodia, Ms Gidley continued to 
explore the political nature of the ECCC through the limitations on defendants and 
witnesses. To highlight some of the challenges faced by the Court, Ms Gidley first 
gave the example of the actions of the Cambodian government in opposing potential 
cases 003 and 004 (which may include defendants currently serving in government). 
Ms Gidley explained how, in December 2008, the international prosecutors sought 
permission to proceed with these cases. The Cambodian co-prosecutors were 
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against this action and the initial permission to investigate these cases by the 
Cambodian investigating judge was swiftly retracted; Ms Gidley believes this 
suggests government control. This suspicion was supported by the similarities 
between the language used by judges and the government spokespersons in refuting 
permission to prosecute the additional cases. Following this, the Cambodian 
government declared that there will be no case following 002.  
 
Ms Gidley also examined another case of suspected government interference in the 
running of the Court by highlighting the example of the refusal by CPP members to 
appear as witnesses. In September 2009, the Court issued summons for 6 CPP 
leaders but the government maintained that they would not participate in ECCC 
proceedings. Ms Gidley suggests that the government is attempting to prevent those 
with links to the past appearing so as to maintain the perception of the CPP as the 
liberators of Cambodia. While police can compel witnesses to appear at the Court 
this was never publically considered.  
 
Finally, Ms Gidley considered the effects of the Cambodian government’s control 
over the ECCC and concluded: first, by not challenging the government’s narrative, 
the Court may increase the perceived legitimacy of the Cambodian government and 
its control of proceedings; second, the reputation of the Court may have been 
damaged amongst the Cambodian population. When the Court publically called for 
CPP party members to appear as witnesses it indicated that CPP links with the Khmer 
Rouge were being concealed but the number of people who will access this 
information is limited. Ms Gidley raised questions about the merits of focusing on a 
small group of people responsible considering the time which has passed and how 
much effect 003 and 004, involving only 5 defendants, could really have. 
 
“Maximising” transitional justice opportunities: the case of East 
Timor’s CAVR 
Heather Castel  
 
About the Presenter:  
Dr Heather Castel taught the Genocide and Persecution course in the School of 
History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics at The University of Queensland in 2010.  
Her primary research interests are in the area of transitional justice, particularly the 
cases of South Africa and East Timor.   
 
Abstract: 
“Maximising” its opportunities to promote truth and reconciliation was a key issue in 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  East Timor’s 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) heeded this lesson and 
incorporated this principle into its operations.  East Timor’s history had been written 
 Legacies and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: A Workshop Report  
 
24 
primarily by foreign scholars and highly contested by an illegal occupying power that 
had utilised the powerful politics of denial. Despite the CAVR having less 
opportunities to “maximise” its operations and less political influence than the TRC, 
its operations have contributed to the continuing debate on transitional justice with 
the establishment of innovative mechanisms that re-wrote the national East 
Timorese narrative, curbed denials and comprehensively established responsibility 
for crimes against humanity from 1976 - 1999.  It has set some important transitional 
justice precedents as the first-ever Asian truth commission.  Its utilisation of 
traditional, restorative law in its Community Reconciliation Process programmes was 
relatively successful and its National Public Hearings were themed hearings, mostly 
tailored to the provisions of international law that gave acknowledgement to victims 
that their violations were universally recognised crimes. 
 
About the Presentation: 
Dr Castel explained how the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission had 
benefitted from a robust mandate and the power to grant amnesties, set its own 
agenda, subpoena people and set search warrants. In contrast, the CAVR was limited 
by its lack of independence and limited resources. The South African TRC achieved 
international attention and quickly translated testimonies into English but East 
Timor’s public relations efforts were not as successful. Both South African and East 
Timorese processes encouraged open forum statements and they both travelled to 
receive statements from those who wished to testify, instead of expecting those 
reporting to come to the court.  
 
The CAVR emphasised the reporting of crimes and atrocities, particularly those 
which occurred in 1999. Hearings were related to: political imprisonments, torture, 
sexual crimes, forced displacement, famine, massacre and the rights of children. Dr 
Castel contrasted this to the South African context, where available resources meant 
hearings considered the complicity of the state in connection to: business, the health 
sector, the media, faith and other categories. The East Timorese government wished 
to focus on national unity and reconciliation throughout the process and favoured a 
conciliatory approach with Indonesia. This is different to South Africa where the 
focus was apartheid as a crime against humanity.  
 
Dr Castel believes that the CAVR maximized its opportunities through a focus on 
crimes which allowed them to include past and historical crimes; this makes it more 
thorough than the South African approach. Dr Castel considered the CAVR to have 
had good outcomes despite its limited funding and resources. One of the outcomes 
was a good quality report but Dr Castel cautioned the workshop participants that 
‘truth’ is always disputable, even in the results of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions. 








About the Presenter:  
Raymond Lau is currently a PhD student at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect.   
 
Abstract:  
Genocide and mass atrocities are all too frequently recurring phenomena. But in 
recent years the world has seen a growing acknowledgment of seeking 
accountability for past atrocities. Progress in the development of post-conflict justice 
is evidenced by the establishment of International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, new hybrid international-national war crimes courts and 
the coming into existence of the International Criminal Court (ICC). While ‘bringing 
the devil to justice’ may be the overarching goal in the aftermath of mass atrocities, 
the emphasis that states and international organisations place on  advancing 
‘accountability’ can be quite different. This paper explores the rationale of the 
search for accountability in the aftermath of mass violence. In particular, by 
questioning the tendency of adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in specific cases, 
it asks whether international awareness of advancing post-conflict justice could be 
translated into meaningful prevention of future occurrences of such atrocities. 
 
 
About the Presentation: 
Mr Lau considered the development of post-conflict justice and the rationale of 
searching for accountability. The establishment of international and hybrid tribunals 
in recent years suggests an increased interest in seeking accountability for violators 
of international humanitarian law. Mr Lau considers this a relatively recent 
phenomenon with a basis in the Nuremberg trials. The importance of justice is 
explained by a number of perspectives including: the backward looking perspective, 
based on retributive justice where individuals deserve punishment to right a wrong; 
the forward looking perspective, which has a utilitarian justification and punishment 
is used to achieve good results for society, through deterrence; and the expression 
perspective, which aims to restore the rule of law and educate about the crimes 
committed. Mr Lau suggests there is a strong preference for retribution and 
deterrence. The International Criminal Court was established in 2002 to end 
impunity and deter potential future atrocities. It has two aims, retribution and 
deterrence. This shows an accepted connection between holding the perpetrators  
accountable and atrocity prevention.  
 




Taking a critical approach to these changes in international criminal justice, Mr Lau 
considered a number of problematic aspects of the international criminal judicial 
system. First, it presupposes an international standard but international criminal law 
simply extends Western Anglo-American law. Second, the ICC is intended to warn 
perpetrators of atrocities that the international community will not accept their 
actions,yet the institution is inherently responsive, rather than pre-emptive. Third, 
justice is not always supportive of peace and the threat of prosecution may prolong 
conflicts as leaders attempt to maintain power to avoid charges. Additionally, justice 
that takes place in the international criminal judicial system is likely to have the 
international community as the primary audience and victims as the secondary 
audience.  
 
Panel Three Questions and Answers 
 
Q1: Raymond Lau was called to comment on the role of the ICC in raising awareness 
of mass atrocity crimes, considering the Eichmann Trial (1961-1962) as an example 
of raising awareness of the Holocaust. Mr Lau responded that thinking about the ICC 
as a means of raising awareness leads to questions such as: who are we seeking 
justice for? Who is the true target audience? Is it just public relations? Mr Lau 
considered this putting the system in danger of having conflicting goals and an 
incoherent focus. A discussion of whether justice as an act of deterrence is a 
disservice to victims led to a dialogue on the subject of reparations led by Heather 
Castel, during which the suggestion was made by Deborah Mayersen that 
reparations carry a symbolic value beyond their economic impact.  
  
Q2: Rebecca Gidley was asked to comment on whether she thought two cases would 
be enough to sustain the positive public perceptions of the court. Ms Gidley 
responded that there had never been an expectation of more than ten cases and it is 
difficult to say how many defendants would be considered a suitable number by the 
public. The sentence given in case 001 (now under appeal) of 30 years to Kaing Guek 
Eav, responsible for the deaths of over 12,000 people, was given as an example of 
the imperfect nature of the Court. 
 
Q3: Dr Castel was asked if the South African amnesty, conditional on guilt, was 
beneficial to reconciliation. Dr Castel responded that results were mixed. It was clear 
that jurists in the ANC (African National Congress) were determined that the 
amnesty was provided as a response to self-incriminating evidence. This approach 
meant that victims learnt more about who was responsible. However, reconciliation 
is a slow process and requires political will which has not been maintained and this 
failure to support the process combined with a lack of effective redistribution of 
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wealth has led to continuing social problems. Dr Castel suggested it was good to 
discuss atrocities openly as it does offer some closure but that this is just a starting 
point.  
 
Q4: Dr Castel was also asked to comment on the value of reconciliation groups and 
other mechanisms. She responded that many mechanisms had been attempted in 
Cambodia but they were Western-centric and this diminished their value. Dr Castel 
suggested these mechanisms would benefit from further consultation, so as to 
understand the local culture. In South Africa there were ad hoc groups but money 
was squandered which could have addressed problems of development. In East 
Timor this opportunity did not exist due to insufficient resources; they were not in a 





































6.  Exhibition Launch and Public Lecture 
 
Lessons from Rwanda: 
The United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide 
 
“Preventing genocide is a collective and individual responsibility. Rwanda’s survivors 
have made us confront the ugly reality of a preventable tragedy. The only way to 
truly honour the memory of those who perished in Rwanda 17 years ago is to ensure 
such events can never occur again.”  - UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
 
The University of Queensland was honoured to host the United Nations Department 
of Public Information exhibition, ‘Lessons from Rwanda: The United Nations and the 
Prevention of Genocide’ in its premiere showing in Australia.  The exhibition was set 
up in the Foyer of the Social Sciences and Humanities Library, a space which attracts 
a high volume of students and staff on a daily basis.  The exhibition was formally 
launched by Professor Gillian Whitehouse, Head of School, School of Political Science 
and International Studies, The University of Queensland.   
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Public Lecture: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A View from Critical 
Transitional Justice Studies 
Alex Hinton 
 
About the Presenter:   
Professor Alex Hinton is Founder and Director of the Center for the Study of 
Genocide, Conflict Resolution, and Human Rights and Professor of Anthropology and 
Global Affairs at Rutgers University, Newark. He is the author of the award-winning 
Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide, and most recently editor of 
Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass 
Violence.   Professor Hinton is the current president of the International Association 
of Genocide Scholars.   
 
Abstract:  
On July 1, 2009, civil party Bou Meng took the stand during the first case being held 
by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC or “Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal”), an international hybrid tribunal established to try the surviving leaders of 
the Khmer Rouge. Elevated on a raised dais in front of Bou Meng sat the trial 
chamber, comprising three Cambodian and two international jurists. To his right sat 
Duch, the former commandant of S-21, the secret interrogation and torture center 
where Bou Meng had been imprisoned during the Khmer Rouge regime (April 17, 
1975 to January 6, 1979). Over 12,283 people perished at S-21, which was at the 
epicenter of a campaign of mass murder and repression that resulted in the death of 
perhaps 1.7 million of Cambodia’s 8 million inhabitants. Bou Meng was one of only a 
handful of survivors, a man who had only lived because he could paint portraits of 
Pol Pot. This presentation explores Bou Meng’s day at the court from the perspective 
of critical transitional justice studies. Specifically, it explores what the act of 
testifying and witnessing meant to Bou Meng, how his subject position and voice 
were produced in the juridical context, and what the speech acts of witnesses like 
Bou Meng and others at the tribunal mean in different discursive communities, 
ranging from international court personnel to villagers on the ground in Cambodia. 
The lecture concludes by considering what insights gleaned from the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal have to say more broadly about transitional justice, genocide prevention, 
and the attempt to seek redress after genocide.  
 
About the Lecture: 
 
The Workshop’s public lecture was presented by Professor Alex Hinton, entitled ‘The 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A View from Critical Transitional Justice Studies.’ Professor 
Hinton’s presentation considered the importance of a critical view of transitional 
justice in the Cambodian context, illustrating this through the example of Case 001 
of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Professor Hinton had 
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followed the process throughout, considering the differing understandings of justice 
and the court process.    
 
The defendant, Kaing Guek Eav, known as Duch, oversaw Tuol Sleng during the 
Khmer Rouge regime. The Civil Parties were 66 people acknowledged as direct 
victims. Some of these victims, including Bou Meng, survived Tuol Sleng because 
they were skilled in trades required by the prison. Professor Hinton described the 
experience of Bou Meng and the Civil Parties in the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia. He expressed that they sometimes found themselves overcome 
with emotion as they faced the perpetrator of the crimes against them and 
recounted their horrific experiences.   
 
The trial began on 30 March 2009 and presented the verdict and sentencing on 26 
July 2010. The trial is currently in a state of appeal. The charges involved Crimes 
Against Humanity and Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Duch 
accepted responsibility before the court and this cooperation is believed to have 
prevented the court from sentencing him to life in prison; instead the guilty verdict 
resulted in a 35 year sentence. This would mean that there was a limited chance 
Duch would live out such a sentence. Reparations included statements of apology 
and acknowledgement of responsibility, to be posted on the ECCC’s official website. 
Professor Hinton drew the audience’s attention to the lack of access most affected 
persons would have to the internet and differing opinions over the sentencing.  
 
Professor Hinton considered the definition of Transitional Justice and how it 
emerged, historically. Professor Hinton emphasised the importance of considering 
what the tribunal and justice mean to Cambodians. ‘Transitional’ implies teleology 
and suggests states journeying from primitive violence through Western notions of 
justice to a perceived end point of conflict recovery. Professor Hinton explained the 
value of critical transitional justice as a means of unpacking ‘common sense’ 
assumptions to find their origin and determining how relevant they were for the 
people affected by violence. He described ‘moments of slippage’ at the courts. An 
example of this is when victims showed emotion during the court proceedings. The 
judges were not prepared for this and requested they control their emotions or else 
the courts would recess.  
 
Judge: Do you think [your wife was] killed at S-21? 
Bou Meng: Your question reminds me [of] a question that I would like to ask Mr 
Kaing Guek Eav. I want to know whether he asked his subordinates to smash my wife 
at S-21 or at Choeung Ek so that I could collect the ashes or remains so that I can 
make her soul rest in peace. 
Judge: You have not answered my question ... 
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Professor Hinton also considered the symbolic meaning of the ECCC emblem. The 
emblem is a hybrid between the traditional Cambodian depiction of justice and 
Western understandings of justice with a figure from the Angkor period holding a 
sword, surrounded by a wreath of olive branches. The Cambodian figure of justice 
holds a sword to symbolise the authority of the court and is usually accompanied by 
two aids who consult scrolls of law. In contrast Lady Justice is blindfolded and holds 
scales to symbolise impartiality. Professor Hinton believes the different 
representations show different understandings of justice but that this has not been 
questioned.  
 
To further illustrate the differing perceptions of justice, Professor Hinton referred to 
a Khmer Rouge Tribunal outreach booklet released by the Khmer Institute of 
Democracy and identified how it, like the courts, provides a limited view of a 
complex history and complex culture. The booklet shows how a person is 
transformed into a democratic citizen who gains rights and becomes a civil party. 
The booklet, part of a court outreach program, does not engage with the 
complexities of varied understandings of justice. Professor Hinton emphasised that 
transitional justice mechanisms are always highly politicised and that the Cambodian 
Courts are no different; but it is for this reason that it is important to question the 
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Public Lecture Question and Answer  
 
During question time Professor Hinton was asked his opinion of Truth Commissions 
and suggested these too are highly politicised to produce a certain truth and a 
particular result; they have value but must be examined critically.  
 
Also questioned was the role of international courts in dealing with the international 
community’s feelings of guilt. Professor Hinton suggested the idea of the Court as a 
mechanism for resolving the international community’s guilt is true to some extent 
and suggests that for this reason donations should also be analysed as gifts that 
create a ‘moral hierarchy’.   
 
The final question asked about the Cambodian understanding of the court. Professor 
Hinton suggested that Buddhism is one way in which the Cambodian people 
understand justice and that some old people believe the guilty will be reborn as 
lower forms. He expanded on this point with an anecdotal reference to the view of 
monks. When he asked a monk “Why did you go to the tribunal?” the monk did not 
respond: “To see justice served”, but rather “To see what’s going on”, indicating that 











7.  Panel Four: Early Warning and Prevention 
of Genocide and Mass Atrocities
 
 
Political Instability and Large-Scale Violence in the Economic North and 
South: Is the process different for richer and poorer societies? 
Benjamin Goldsmith, Arcot Sowmya and Dimitri Semenovich 
 
About the Presenters:  
Associate Professor Ben Goldsmith is an Associate Professor in the Department of 
Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney.  He is the 
author of Imitation in International Relations: Observational Learning, Analogies, and 
Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine.  Professor Arcot Sowmya is a Professor in the 
School of Computer Science and Engineering at The University of New South Wales.  
Professor Sowmya’s research interests are in the area of image analysis and 
recognition, and software engineering.  Dimitri Semenovich (non-presenting co-
author) is a PhD Student in the School of Computer Science and Engineering at The 
University of New South Wales.  
 
Abstract:  
This paper builds on existing scholarship in the areas of political instability, state 
failure, and mass violence (e.g., Harff 2003; Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004). It 
introduces two innovations, which add to understanding of the processes leading to 
serious political instability in states, and those leading from instability to large-scale 
violence. First, it distinguishes between North and South in economic terms by 
examining the processes separately based on higher and lower per capita gross 
domestic product. Second, it employs 2-stage selection models to correct for 
potential selection bias (Heckman 1979; Sartori 2003). Thus, the quantitative analysis 
will answer the questions of whether the processes leading to the most serious 
instances of internal violence are different for richer and poorer states, and whether 
current understanding of this process in the quantitative literature is biased by 
failure to consider selection effects explicitly.  
 
About the Presentation: 
The first presentation in this panel was “Political Instability and Large-Scale Violence 
in the Economic North and South: Is the process different for richer and poorer 
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societies?” Associate Professor Goldsmith offered workshop participants the 
opportunity to see the pattern recognition work the group are undertaking related 
to instability and large scale violence (mass atrocities, mass killing and large scale 
violence in civil wars) with the ultimate goal of creating software relevant to policy 
makers.  Two areas of interest for the researchers were: firstly, if there is a 
difference between richer and poorer countries in the causes of large scale violence; 
and secondly, to analyse whether it is important to think of the path to large scale 
violence as a process, with more than one stage.  
 
Associate Professor Goldsmith presented a visualisation of large scale violence and 
instability, displayed chronologically starting at 1960.  Within the model ‘large scale 
violence’ was defined as the killing of one thousand people within a year and 
‘political instability’ was determined by the Political Instability Taskforce’s 
assessment. The variables of interest were: military personnel; regime type; 
durability of the regime; GDP per capita; and others.  The project aims to accurately 
forecast political instability for the following year; and in cases of instability the 
likelihood of mass violence. It is important to note that the model is still under 
development and findings thus far are tentative. 
 
Associate Professor Goldsmith shared with the workshop participants some of the 
team’s hypotheses related to the project, including: that some actors involved in 
political instability also contemplate large-scale violence from the outset, meaning 
that selection bias is a danger for analysis of large-scale violence outcomes; that 
there will be a difference between the causal processes for richer and poorer states; 
and that wealthier states will have more capacity to resist large scale violence.  
 
Many variables initially under examination have been found to be not robustly 
significant under this model; such as democracy with factions and elections. Other 
interesting outcomes from the project so far include that Gross Domestic Product 
per capita has not been identified as a significant cause of Large Scale Violence once 
its role in general political instability is considered. Results have also supported the 
view that newer regimes are not statistically subject to great instability but states 
which are poor and have very large armies have a higher incidence of large scale 
violence. Partial Democracy with factions is considered the most robust variable in 
the model for forecasting instability but as this variable remains quite constant over 
time it is difficult to use this variable to predict year-to-year instability. Partial 
democracy with factions has a negative correlation to large scale violence and full 
democracy appears to have a pacifying effect on situations of political instability,  
suggesting that regime type does matter.  
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Understanding the Relationship between Risk and Resilience in the 




About the Presenter:  
Stephen McLoughlin is a PhD student at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility 
to Protect. Most recently he presented a paper at the International Network of 
Genocide Scholars conference in Sussex in July 2010. 
 
Abstract:  
Too often, approaches to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities are limited 
by a tendency to focus on what goes wrong, instead of what goes right. The purpose 
of this presentation is to provide a framework for analysis that will enable a greater 
understanding of why some countries that are located in vulnerable regions have not 
experienced genocide or other mass atrocities. Providing a focus on why such crimes 
have not occurred, rather than solely on why they have, will yield insights into the 
way that genocide and other mass atrocities can be prevented. The concept of 
prevention is premised on the identifying and addressing of ‘root causes’. This is 
problematic because it assumes a linear inevitability of a particular outcome. To put 
it simply, addressing root causes of potential genocide or mass atrocities is not 
enough to ensure effective prevention, as it does not accurately account for the 
complex range of factors that both increase and mitigate risk. It is the incorporation 
of mitigating factors into this framework that gives insight into the complex 
contingencies that characterise the risk of genocide and mass atrocities. In 
examining this interplay of factors, the paper utilises the examples of Botswana and 
Zambia. Both countries have been referred to as African models - Botswana for its 
stable economic growth and robust multi-party democracy, and Zambia for being the 
first country on the continent to enjoy a peaceful transition from a one party state to 
a multi-party democratic form of governance. Despite this, both countries have 
displayed a number of risk factors, which are associated with mass atrocities. Using 
these countries as case studies, this presentation offers a different approach to 
prevention, one which looks at the way resilience factors within countries are able to 
mitigate the risk of mass atrocities. 
 
About the Presentation: 
The second presentation in this panel was “Understanding the relationship between 
risk and resilience in the long term prevention of mass atrocities: An examination of 
Botswana and Zambia,” by Stephen McLoughlin. This presentation investigated the 
social, political and economic factors which mitigate violence, using Botswana and 
Zambia as examples. Mr McLoughlin described the conditions of the San Bushman of 
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the Kalahari Game Reserve, a minority group who suffered discrimination. They were 
mass evacuated from and denied access to wells but they appealed to the judicial 
system and the resulting ruling was in their favour, classing the government’s actions 
as illegal. Mr McLoughlin identified the effective operation of a legal system which 
can offer support to the struggles of groups, like the Basarwa, as a safety net. It is an 
example of a genocide prevention measure, as managing diversity is an important  
aspect in preventing the escalation of violence.  
 
Mr McLoughlin continued by considering structural prevention through comparisons 
with public health models, premised on the idea of identifying root causes. In the 
public health context this approach is criticised by medical researchers as it creates 
grey areas between health and disease, and over-diagnosis can create sickness in 
healthy patients. Building upon these criticisms in the prevention of violence Mr 
McLoughlin identified problems with the current approach to mass atrocity 
prevention: the absence of consensus on the root causes of past atrocities; the 
limited progress toward resolving root causes of civil war; and the assumption of a 
linear inevitability of mass violence, ignoring the prevention of mass atrocities in 
certain states. Mr McLoughlin reminded the audience of the view of UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon - that further research is required to explain why mass violence 
erupts in some states but not in others. This presentation also reflected on the 
somewhat contradictory nature of diagnosing root causes and the Responsibility to 
Protect; as the former assumes a third party is required to prescribe solutions while 
the latter emphasises the responsibility of the state to protect their citizens. 
 
Mr McLoughlin suggested that it is important to consider the preconditions of mass 
atrocities, as mass violence rarely occurs without these preconditions and this 
provides a level of risk, but that the mitigating factors are also worth considering.   
 
To further explore the value of mitigating factors, Mr McLoughlin presented the 
example of Zambia. Zambia underwent a peaceful transition from a single party state 
to a multi-party democracy in 1991 but is ranked tenth in the world in terms of risk 
of political instability, according to the Centre for International Development and 
Conflict Management. The identified pre-conditions for mass violence in Zambia 
include: social division, as there is a growing emphasis on ethno-linguistic identity in 
the selection of political leaders; limited democracy, for example the office of the 
president is extremely powerful and opposition parties suffer harassment; limited 
rule of law, as the judiciary is not impartial and corruption and police harassment 
occur; and inequality of economic opportunity, as Zambia is poor and wealth is 
highly concentrated amongst a small number of people. The mitigating factors 
identified in Zambia include: social cohesion and ethnic fluidity, as ethnic groups 
have a colonial, rather than historical basis, and are thus relatively new; a strong civil 
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society, which can support democratic reform; government management of ethnic 
diversity; and the peaceful transition to democracy. Mr McLoughlin suggested that 
these mitigating factors help prevent mass atrocity violence and that it is important 
to increase understanding of the link between the factors which mitigate and those 
which increase the risk of mass atrocity violence in states.  
 
Why Not Genocide?  Exploring Constraints that Inhibit Genocide Onset 
in at-risk Societies  
Deborah Mayersen  
 
About the Presenter:  
Dr Deborah Mayersen is Program Leader for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass 
Atrocities at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.  Her research 
interests include genocide prevention and the Armenian and Rwandan genocides.  
 
Abstract:  
In January 1962, United Nations Commissioner to Rwanda Majid Rahnema warned of 
the imminent danger of genocide there.  In Rwandan society he saw “the symptoms 
of an explosive situation”, and accused the ruling party of a policy “apparently 
designed to eliminate ... the Tutsi minority.”  Mr. Rahnema was correct about the 
danger of genocide, but seriously misjudged its imminence.  While ethnic massacres 
did erupt in the country within two years of his warning, they were very rapidly 
quelled, and a further three decades passed before the 1994 genocide.  Similar 
predictions of extermination also preceded the 1915 Armenian genocide by some 
decades.  We can infer from the genocides that eventually occurred in these cases 
that the observations of risk were real.  Yet in both Ottoman Turkey and Rwanda 
there were significant pre-genocidal massacres that did not escalate into genocide.  
These massacres can be considered as examples where genocide might have been 
expected to occur, but did not materialise.  What prevented the violence from 
escalating into genocide in these cases?  What can we learn from them about 
constraints against genocide?  If we consider each of these examples of pre-
genocidal massacres in conjunction with the subsequent genocides that occurred, 
key differences can be identified that influenced the extent and nature of the violent 
outbreaks.  These provide new insights as to how constraints can effectively inhibit 
states from adopting genocidal policies and practices, even in circumstances of 
substantial risk.   
 
About the Presentation: 
Dr Mayersen began the presentation by suggesting that while the common focus in 
genocide prevention is the pre-conditions and risk escalation associated with 
genocide, it is also important to look at the constraints in situations where there is a 
grave risk of genocide, but it does not occur. Two cases of pre-genocidal massacres 
were presented, in Rwanda in 1963-64 and in Ottoman Armenia in 1894-96, to 
identify the constraints involved which limited the extent of the massacres.  
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In the 1880s and early 1890s ‘a deliberate policy of extermination’ and ‘a settled 
plan to slowly exterminate’ the Armenian minority were reported in Ottoman 
Armenia. As Christians in a Muslim empire, the Ottoman Armenians had been 
considered second class citizens but the decline of the Ottoman Empire led to an 
increase in persecution against the Armenians. The Treaty of Berlin aimed to aid the 
Armenians and allow them to practice their religion but led to further persecution 
and sporadic violence. The Armenians became adept at fighting Kurdish groups who 
attacked them.  In 1894, aided by soldiers from the regular army, the Kurds attacked, 
resulting in the destruction of half the villages in the Sassoun region as well as 
massacres, rape and slaughter. Britain and France called for an end to the violence 
when the death numbered 6000, yet massacres continued sporadically.   From 1894 
to 1896 over 100,000 Armenians were killed in what became known as the Hamidian 
massacres, but they cannot be regarded as a global attempt to exterminate the 
Armenian minority.  A massacre in Constantinople in August 1896, witnessed by 
many European diplomats, led to an international outcry that contributed to the 
cessation of massacres.   
 
In January 1962, 32 years before the Rwandan genocide, the UN Visiting Commission 
to Rwanda reported that the government was “Adopting a social policy apparently 
designed to eliminate … the Tutsi minority”. Just two years later in December 1963 
and January 1964 several thousand Tutsi were killed in ethnic massacres, but they 
remained limited in scope and duration.  Many historical factors contributed to the 
massacres, including a long history of inequality between the Hutu majority and 
Tutsi minority, the institutionalisation of racial policies under Belgian colonial rule 
and the political upheaval associated with decolonisation.   
 
Dr Mayersen identified several factors in each case which may have prevented these 
massacres from escalating into genocide. In the Hamidian Massacres these included 
international factors in the form of the threat of European intervention, the 
ideological factor of the established place of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire, 
combined with the weakness of the Empire. In Rwanda, the massacres were limited 
by the size of the army, poor communications across the country, the perceived 
possibility of international intervention and the lack of an extremist ideology.   
 
Dr Mayersen determined from this that international and ideological factors as well 
as a lack of capacity to commit genocide can have a constraint effect.  International 
engagement can be effective, if it is both timely and perceived as genuine; 
intervention 2-5 years before genocide can disrupt the development of genocidal 
ideology and prevent genocide from being attempted.  There is also a relationship 
between the power and capacity of a regime and the development of a genocidal 
ideology.   




Panel Four Question and Answer  
 
Q1: The first question posed to the panel related to the state-centric model of 
genocide and how genocide is defined. Deborah Mayersen responded first saying 
that the Rwandan mass atrocities of the 1960s were not called genocide at the time, 
not even by the UN. She determined this was a result of comparisons made to the 
Holocaust and genocide as the death of millions of people. She continued that the 
massacres in Rwanda in the 1960s are considered genocide in recent quantitative 
studies. Dr Mayersen defines genocide based on intention and in the Armenian and 
Rwandan massacres she presented, the intention was not to exterminate the groups.  
 
Ben Goldsmith added that considering intent is a typical assessment mechanism and 
in relation to the question of why genocide is considered with a state-focus, in his 
study it was a result of data availability. Discussion then led to suggestions that there 
should be further investigation of localised models of mass atrocity analysis and that 
genocidal massacres may be a preferable term for smaller scale events. Also raised 
was the importance of genocide definitions as Crimes Against Humanity becomes  
entrenched in law.  
 
Q2: A question addressed to Ben Goldsmith requested clarification about the way 
elections effect his model and whether there is a lag. Dr Goldsmith responded that 
there is a forward lag and that all elections are included in the model but only some 
have a significant effect. Generally, elections have been noted to provide a forum for 
political disagreement that can allow states to maintain stability. Dr Goldsmith 
emphasised that the model at this stage was best at revealing the preconditions for 
violence and not why violence or instability might be expected within a short time 
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8. Panel Five: The United Nations, 




Political Realism, Sovereignty and Intervention: Is Genocide Prevention 
Really Possible in a World of Sovereign States? 
Paul Bartrop  
 
About the Presenter:  
Dr Paul Bartrop is the Ida E. King Distinguished Visiting Professor in Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies at Richard Stockton College, New Jersey.  His most recent 
published works include Fifty Key Thinkers on the Holocaust and Genocide (with 
Steven Jacobs, 2010) and The Genocide Studies Reader (co-edited with Samuel 
Totten, 2009).  
 
Abstract:  
This paper argues that the major inhibition to states intervening to prevent or stop 
genocide is the very states system prevailing in the world today. While it is true that 
the global move in recent decades towards the furtherance of internationalist 
principles has seen much in the way of international law-making and law-enforcing 
with regard to genocide, the single most decisive factor standing in the way of 
genocide prevention has been found in the reality of the world of nations; 
accordingly, states find intervention in humanitarian issues to be a luxury which 
often will not be pursued on the grounds of simple nation self-interest.  While this 
depressing (and, some might say, old-fashioned and obvious) perspective leaves 
little room for optimism, there are examples from history that suggest it might be 
the most logical way of explaining why states do not (or do) become involved in the 
internal affairs of others for the purpose of stopping genocide. This paper considers 
why the international states system has not been successful in preventing state 
intervention to stop genocide, and further, shows why it was that such initiatives as 
international legislation and the creation of supposedly cooperative bodies as the 
United Nations have been neutralized by the persistence of Realpolitik in relations 
between states. It concludes with a reflection on what this signifies for the future of 
genocide prevention and intervention, and whether, as a result, existing strategies 
are likely to be effective in the 21st century.  
 
About the Presentation: 
Dr Bartrop argued that it is the high priority given to state sovereignty that has 
inhibited states from intervening in other states to stop or prevent genocide. In 
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order to support this argument, he provided several examples of past initiatives that 
have been undertaken by the international community, but which have been of 
limited utility due to concerns regarding state sovereignty.  The first of these 
examples was the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which laid down important 
guidelines regarding the conduct of war and the prospects for diminishing the risks 
of war. Dr. Bartrop acknowledged that these conventions were important in that 
they set ideals that all states should aspire to, and codified actions that could be 
considered war crimes. However, despite the humanitarian standards that these 
conventions emphasized, Dr. Bartrop asserted that these conventions failed to 
establish any enforcement mechanisms (sanctions), such as an international court in 
which perpetrators of human rights abuses and war crimes could be tried. This was 
largely due to concerns raised by signatory states regarding the effects that such 
mechanisms may have for the impingement of their sovereignty. Hence, Dr. Bartrop 
noted that while the Hague Conventions were important in establishing 
humanitarian standards, they failed to adequately set up the mechanisms through 
which the international community could intervene to stop or prevent genocide. 
 
Following this, Dr. Bartrop focused on the role that the League of Nations played in 
preventing genocide. He argued while the League conceptualised a new world order 
based on diplomacy and the rule of law, little was discussed in the way of 
multilateral intervention. The result was that member states were extremely 
unwilling to engage in any actions such as peacekeeping or multilateral diplomacy, 
which they perceived as an impingement upon other states’ sovereignty, and, by 
interpolation, upon their own sovereignty. 
 
However, despite the failure of the League of Nations to bring about lasting peace, 
as was signified by the outbreak of the Second World War, Dr. Bartrop argued it did 
highlight certain important issues that needed to be addressed. Firstly, the 
international community realised the urgent need to set up mechanisms that would 
constrain state behaviour regardless of the effects this may have on sovereignty. Dr. 
Bartrop also argued that the Second World War was pivotal in emphasizing the need 
to hold not only states, but also individuals responsible for their actions during times 
of war. This meant that no one was above the rule of law, and individuals could no 
longer hide behind the excuse of following the orders of superiors to avoid 
punishment for war crimes. As Dr. Bartrop noted, these developments were 
significant as they eventually led to the codification of the Nuremberg Conventions. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Bartrop noted that the most important contribution for the 
prevention of genocide was made by the United Nations, in the form of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). The 
reason why this Convention was such a landmark document with regard to the 
prevention of genocide, coming as it did as the result of a series of political 
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compromises on the part of the great powers during the Cold War, was because it 
specifically defined the acts that could be considered as genocide, and asserted that 
persons committing such acts would be tried by a tribunal of the state in the 
territory of which the act was committed, or by an international penal tribunal. 
Despite these important contributions, Dr. Bartrop noted that even the Genocide 
Convention has not been able to adequately convince the international community 
to intervene for the prevention of genocide, as was evident by the lack of action 
taken by the international community in even the gravest cases of genocide, such as 
in Bosnia and Rwanda. 
 
The presentation then focused one of the most controversial attempts undertaken 
by NATO to prevent genocide, a campaign referred to as Operation Allied Force. This 
was in response to a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbian 
government against the Albanian population in Kosovo. While supporters of NATO 
argued that this signified that NATO would not tolerate such atrocities by 
governments, Dr. Bartrop emphasized that it is important to keep in mind that 
NATO’s interests primarily lie in the maintenance of peace in the North Atlantic 
region, and hence, is not an alliance that is active in genocide prevention. 
Furthermore, he noted that this invasion was highly criticised as being an act of 
aggression, due the fact that it was carried out without the approval of the UN 
Security Council. 
 
In his concluding remarks, Dr. Batrtop asserted that there are no easy solutions to 
mitigate the reservations that states have in playing a more active role in genocide 
prevention, which are based on concerns for national sovereignty. He also noted 
that while physical intervention may be effective, states should be careful to get UN 
approval in order to prevent such actions being classified as an act of aggression. 
Furthermore, Dr. Bartrop argued that in order to ensure a world without genocide, 
the UN should be given greater authority to impinge on sovereignty, and there needs 
be greater firmness, political will and cooperation of all international players. He 
noted that while it is unlikely for all of this to come together soon, there remains 
great hope that it will crystallise and become effective sometime in the 21st century.  
 
 
The UN Security Council and Mass Atrocity Crimes: Prevention or 
Reaction?  
Jess Gifkins  
 
About the Presenter: Jess Gifkins is a PhD student at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect. 
 
 




The complex and convoluted dynamics involved in drafting resolutions in the United 
Nations Security Council mean that it can often take months of negotiations before 
weak, compromise resolutions are tabled. The slow and politically challenging nature 
of this process raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the Security Council 
in responding to mass atrocity crimes in a timely and decisive manner, as agreed to 
at the 2005 World Summit. The Council was designed to be a selective body, 
particularly with the veto power of the five permanent members, and this raises 
further challenges for the Council in taking action when mass atrocity crimes are 
imminent or ongoing. This raises important questions about where the focus of the 
responsibility to protect is, and should be, in responding to mass atrocity crimes. 
Prevention and early engagement are often cited as the preferable and most cost 
effective response to mass atrocity crimes, but it is also important to note that we 
cannot necessarily rely on a timely and decisive response from the Security Council 
once the situation has deteriorated to the point where a robust response from the 
Council is needed. This further strengthens the role of the preventative aspects of 
the responsibility to protect. 
 
About the Presentation: 
Ms Gifkins began her presentation by providing a brief background to the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. Within this context, she noted that the R2P is 
based in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, 
and includes the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and their incitement. Ms Gifkins also asserted that the R2P was 
significantly a response to the questions that had emerged in the 1990s about 
whether there was a ‘right to intervention’.  
 
The presentation then focused on the three pillars which make up the R2P doctrine, 
and which are highlighted in paragraph 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
outcome document. Ms Gifkins identified the first pillar as being the responsibility of 
all states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. The second pillar was highlighted as being the 
responsibility of the international community to help states to uphold these 
responsibilities. The third pillar of the R2P was stated as being the responsibility of 
the Security Council to take collective action where a state ‘manifestly fails’ to 
protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. 
 
Ms Gifkins also emphasized there are some disagreements as to whether R2P should 
be conceptualised as a speech act or a policy agenda. In explaining this, she drew 
onto arguments of Eli Stamnes who contented that ‘speaking R2P’ will eventually 
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lead to more robust action. Ms Gifkins noted that Gareth Evans holds a similar view, 
who also suggests that only a dozen situations at any one point in time can be 
defined as R2P situations. She highlighted that such views are in direct opposition to 
the way that R2P is conceptualised by Alex Bellamy, who perceives R2P as being 
applicable to all states at all times and thus, is a deep policy agenda.  
 
Following this, Ms Gifkins focused on the array of barriers that R2P faces, with 
regards to ‘automatic’ R2P reaction by the United Nations Security Council. She 
noted that the first barrier is the power that the permanent five members in the 
Council have to formally veto any resolution from being passed. While 
recommendations have been made to limit the power of the veto with regards to 
situations involving genocide or crimes against humanity, these recommendations 
have not been supported by the P5. Nevertheless, Ms Gifkins did observe that formal 
vetos are very rarely used. What is more frequent is the informal veto, which means 
that the permanent five often threaten to veto a particular resolution if it is put to 
vote. In this way, they are often successful in ensuring that issues that are not in 
their interests are not even discussed. As Ms Gifkins noted, this is problem is further 
exacerbated by the wide discretion that the Council has in defining what exactly 
constitutes ‘threats to international peace and security’ and how to respond to such 
threats. She also asserted that even when the Council is able to find enough 
consensus to authorise an intervention, if the consent of the state is not provided, 
the Council is unlikely to take any effective action. Ms Gifkins also noted that the 
subjective terms included in paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Document act 
as a further caveat to collective action by the Security Council. 
 
In order to provide an example of these issues in an actual R2P case, Ms Gifkins 
focused on the United Nations Security Council resolution 1706, which dealt with the  
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. While there was broad acceptance that R2P crimes 
were committed in Darfur, the resolution was drafted using the phrase ‘invites 
consent of Sudanese government’. Ms Gifkins noted that this was clear case of a 
situation whereby the lack of consent by the host government acted as a barrier to 
the Council taking action in a crisis situation, even when an issue has been elevated 
above ‘politics as normal’.  
 
In her concluding remarks, Ms Gifkins noted that resolution 1706 was a key instance 
of R2P as a ‘speech action’, where there was a deep gap between political 
accountability and words. She also observed that it demonstrated a clear conceptual 
confusion over the relationship between R2P and consent, which in theory can 
include non-consensual intervention. However, she asserted that in order for this to 
occur in practice, member states need to be willing to put forward their troops and 
military capabilities.   
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About the Presenter:  
Dr Phil Orchard is a Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies in the School of Political 
Science and International Studies at The University of Queensland.  His primary 
research interests include regime-induced displacement, and internally displaced 
persons.   
 
Abstract: 
Regime-induced displacement, when governments deliberately displace their own 
populations, is an issue not only for the Asia-Pacific region, but also for the wider 
world. Such incidents not only lead to large scale flows of refugees and internally 
displaced persons, but at the extreme blur into cases of ethnic cleansing and 
genocide. Yet the international response remains ad hoc, discordant, and 
problematic. This presentation examines four historical and contemporary cases of 
regime induced displacement in the region, including East Pakistan (1971), East 
Timor (1999), Burma/Myanmar (2000-2006), and Sri Lanka (2005-2009) in order to 
understand the decision-making processes at the international and regional levels 
which contributed to differing forms of international involvement ranging from 
interventions and deployment of peacekeepers to limited or no response.  
 
About the Presentation: 
Dr. Orchard began his presentation by defining regime induced displacements as 
being situations whereby governments deliberately use coercive tactics to cause 
mass displacement within their own population. He then identified the three main 
reasons why regime induced displacements are so problematic. Firstly, he noted that 
it transcends the traditional divide between refugees and internally displaced 
persons, whereby refugees receive protection under international law and internally 
displaced persons do not. Second, Dr Orchard noted that victims of internal 
displacement remain targets of their own government even after displacement, as is 
evident in the case of Darfur. Finally, he asserted that it can blur the lines between 
regime induced displacement, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, as all these tactics 
may be used by governments to bring about displacement. 
 
Following this, Dr Orchard noted that within the years 1991-2006 there were a 
recorded 103 situations of mass displacement in 53 countries, which produced over 
a hundred thousand refugees and internally displaced persons. He asserted that out 
of this, 60 per cent were caused in whole or in part by regime induced displacement, 
while the rest was mainly the result of civil war. However, Dr. Orchard emphasized 
that it is important to keep in mind that governments often use civil war as a tactic 
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to bring about mass displacement, and hence, there is no clear division between 
regime induced displacement and civil war. With regards to mass displacement in 
the Asia Pacific during this period, he noted that there were twenty major cases. 
Four of these cases were large refugee flows, while the other sixteen cases were 
large scale IDP flows. 
 
Dr Orchard then argued that UN Security Council plays a vital role in preventing such 
mass displacement. For instance, during the 1990s, there was a growing trend of 
framing refugees and IDPs as Chapter VII issues, which deals with the responsibility 
of the Security Council to take ‘action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches 
of the peace, and acts of aggression’. According to Dr Orchard, the reason why mass 
displacement was framed within these terms was due to the potential that it holds 
to disrupt neighbouring states and regions, and thus, challenge international peace 
and security. However, Dr Orchard argued that while the Security Council has 
accepted this responsibility in rhetoric, as was seen with the signing of the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, it has significantly failed to take direct action to 
prevent regime induced displacement. In fact, Libya was the only case in which the 
Security Council authorised intervention without the consent of the state to stop the 
mass atrocities, violence and displacement that was being carried out by the regime. 
For example, despite widespread evidence of mass atrocities being carried out in 
East Pakistan in 1971, the UN Security Council refused to authorise any form of 
intervention, by arguing that it was a domestic issue and thus, fell under the 
sovereignty clause of the UN Charter.  
 
In his concluding arguments, Dr Orchard noted that it is evident by the authorisation 
of intervention in Libya that the Security Council has demonstrated greater 
willingness to engage in humanitarian issues. However, it remains to be seen if this 
will be a lasting trend. 
 
 
Panel Five Question and Answer 
 
Q1: The first question in this panel asked Dr Bartrop to respond to the claim that, 
unlike his reading of history which he describes as being very non interventionist, the 
1990s was highly interventionist. 
 
In response, Dr Bartrop argued that while there have been more interventionist 
resolutions passed since the end of the Second World War, there has also been a 
greater upsurge of anti human behaviour since 1945. Hence, he asserted that there 
is a great disconnection between these two trends, which makes it difficult to argue 
that the has been wide intervention by the international community.  
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Q2: Question two asked for a clarification on the role and prospects of non-invasive 
strategies in genocide prevention. 
 
In response, Dr. Bartrop asserted that for whatever options are suggested, there is 
always going to be opposition due to concerns regarding national sovereignty. 
Hence, even with regards to non-invasive strategies, he argued that what is vital is 









































About the Roundtable:  
The roundtable session offered workshop participants the opportunity to explore the 
theme of “Genocide and Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: Legacies and Prevention” 
as well as providing a forum for the participants to interact and put forward further 
ideas.  Workshop participants and guests were invited to consider and discuss a 
range of critical questions concerning our region, including:  
 
 What are the ongoing legacies of mass atrocities in the Asia-Pacific region?  
 How do they impact upon the current and future stability of the region, and 
on the lives of those who are affected?   
 What are the risks of future mass atrocities in the Asia-Pacific region? 
 What kinds of strategies can be utilised to mitigate those risks?  
 Are there particular opportunities or challenges within the region that might 
influence these processes?  
 What is the best way forward in addressing the legacies of past atrocities in 
the Asia-Pacific region?  
 What is the best way forward in approaching mass atrocity prevention in the 
Asia-Pacific region?  
 
The roundtable session concluded by asking participants to propose issues for future 
consideration, and to propose recommendations that may contribute to preventing 
future genocide and mass atrocities in the region. 
Roundtable Discussion: 
Associate Professor Fernandes began the open discussion on the workshop theme by 
drawing attention to the role of civil society in early warning and the prevention of 
genocide and mass atrocities. He offered the example of East Timor in 1975 
compared to East Timor in 1999. Australian journalists were killed on Timor’s border 
in 1975 but Associate Professor Fernandes suggested that, at that time, President 
Suharto had not decided to invade Timor. To support this view he suggested that 
President Suharto waited for five weeks after the incident to see what the 
international reaction would be and only when he believed that there would be no 
attempt to halt the invasion did he proceed. In 1975 the evacuation of Australian ex-
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patriots was a high priority for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). 
Fenandes contrasted this account with Timor in 1999, when although the situation 
within Timor was unstable, civilians arrived to witness the ballot and provide their 
accounts to the rest of the world through the internet. This example illustrated the 
capabilities of civil society and the international community to allow information 
dissemination. Through micro-level organisation, early warning systems are created. 
In support of Associate Professor Fernandes’ argument, Dr Phil Orchard shared with 
the workshop participants his insight into the East Pakistan case. In this case 
government control of the media was utilised to portray the situation as calm and 
stable. The true situation was revealed when a journalist defected; reaching West  
Pakistan and then the United Kingdom.   
 
Dr Deborah Mayersen further explored the scope of civil society in genocide and 
mass atrocity prevention, drawing the group’s attention to the existence of a 
genocide prevention network which receives donations in preparation for the 
possibility of genocide, rather than as a response. While pre-meditated actions have 
been open to states in the past, civil societies are now able to prepare and respond 
quickly to situations as they develop. Associate Professor Fernandes suggested that 
oppressed groups benefited from solidarity with Western activist groups and 
without this they will have lower chances for successful outcomes. Stephen 
McLoughlin also supported the view that civil society can be an asset to genocide 
prevention. He referred to Iran in the early 1980s to support this view. The regime 
had planned to destroy the Baha’i by killing a maximum of twenty-thousand, 
believing this would urge the remaining Baha’i population to convert to Islam. Early 
into this plan it became apparent that it would not be successful. The global Baha’i 
population conducted a spontaneous campaign which quickly became very well 
organised. They lobbied governments and media to make sure the Iranian 
government’s actions received global scrutiny. International Alert models their  
operations on this campaign.  
 
Professor Alex Hinton mentioned that the presentations at the workshop had a 
strong state focus and more attention could be offered to international, global and 
local perspectives. Dr Deborah Mayersen concurred with this point. Professor Hinton 
continued that is was important to understand how these levels of analysis were 
connected to provide a more accurate understanding of the issues in question as 
there is a tendency amongst academics to collect diverse views under simplistic 
categories.  
 
Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw suggested that working at an individual level it 
was important to engage with the reactions of young people to conflict. The ability 
to analyse the dominant discourse was highlighted by Associate Professor Bagshaw 
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as a life-long skill which children should be taught. The introduction of peer 
mediation and conflict mediation skills to the mainstream curriculum was 
recommended, particularly if it involved the community. Associate Professor 
Bagshaw suggested that this approach would allow conflict prevention to occur at 
the individual and communal levels. Annie Pohlman drew on her field work and 
research to add that in situations where mass atrocities have occurred, individual 
choices are the relevant issue in spite of outside pressures. Dr Mayersen suggested 
education about common humanity as a long term genocide prevention measure 
and reminded workshop participants that risk of genocide can be a long term issue. 
Associate Professor Ben Goldsmith drew attention to the case of Yugoslavia where 
there was intermarriage and low levels of fractured nationalism but violence 
occurred despite these indications of inter-ethnic tolerance. Conversely, in the 
United States there is evidence of religious intolerance yet no mass atrocities. 
Associate Professor Goldsmith recommended analysing the institutions and ties 
which contribute to these factors, including in the context of civil society, to provide 
an understanding of the factors which contribute to the prevention of genocide. Also 
considered valuable is further investigation of how civil society functions effectively 
to prevent genocide and how it fails.  
 
Associate Professor Bagshaw recognised that the workshop had not included the 
opportunity to talk about the contributions of women as peacemakers, which in 
some cases have been very successful. An example offered by Dr Mayersen was the 
local level conflict mediation training offered by Oxfam to women in Sri Lanka.  
 
When the workshop participants were asked what could prevent genocide, there 
were a variety of responses. Associate Professor Bagshaw suggested increased 
education about genocide and more activists working to prevent it. Large armies 
were mentioned as a factor which might promote genocide by Annie Pohlman. 
Professor Hinton added that many of these indicators are currently appearing. He 
urged further engagement with these issues and suggested Libya and Burma as good 
candidates for this consideration.  
 
Associate Professor Goldsmith suggested increased education, democratisation, 
development and higher GDP per capita could be beneficial. Dr Mayersen 
questioned whether it was economic growth or economic resilience which was most 
valuable. Rwanda illustrates this point as it experienced high levels of economic 
growth but did not have strong economic resilience and, when the country 
experienced an economic crisis, genocide occurred. Dr Mayersen recommended 
further unpacking the connection between economic variables and genocide. 
Professor Hinton was concerned about adopting democracy as a prevention strategy 
as it is relies on liberal democratic teleology; he cautioned the workshop participants  
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to be aware of this as a Western-centric perspective. 
 
Associate Professor Goldsmith argued that while these ideas of democracy may have 
Western roots, they are not exclusively Western. Taiwan and South Korea have both 
experienced effective democracy. These ideas seem to be able to function in many 
societies. Their effect has been visible in Associate Professor Goldsmith’s data 
analysis. Another feature that Associate Professor Goldsmith considers important - 
although it did not appear in his model - is the ethnic division and the treatment of 
minorities which allow mass atrocities to take place. Discrimination does not have to 
have a legal basis to become an accepted norm. Rwanda and Indonesia were 
mentioned as examples of situations of discrimination.  
 
Ms Pohlman noted that in Indonesia, one of the main factors that has contributed to 
the outbreak of mass atrocities has been the lack of strong and accountable 
institutions. As a result, even when there are strict laws preventing certain actions, 
there is a lack of effective institutions to enforce them. Dr Mayersen noted that legal 
discrimination is another main factor that has contributed to the risk of mass 
atrocities in numerous cases. Mr Tay asserted that ethnic discrimination may also 
lead to the outbreak of mass atrocities. In support of this argument, he provided the 
example of Malaysia, where the majority ethnic group, the Bumaputra, are given 
special privileges by the government. He stated that such practices have become so 
institutionalised that they are seldom even questioned by the general population. 
This highlights the importance of raising awareness within the local community 
about the nature and dangers of such injustices. In emphasizing the importance of 
this, Mr Tay compared the cases of Germany and Japan. He noted that in Germany, 
efforts undertaken by the government and other groups within the country to raise 
awareness about the Holocaust has resulted in a high level of shame among the 
German population. In contrast, the Japanese government has removed evidence of 
wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese army. As such, the Japanese 
population are generally unaware that such atrocities were ever committed.  
 
Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw asserted that there is a general unawareness even 
among the Australian population about the mass atrocities that were committed 
against the indigenous population. Dr Mayersen voiced that the Australian 
population is generally ambivalent to genocide awareness and prevention, even in 
the broad community, with most schools only focusing on the Holocaust as part of 
genocide studies. Mr McLoughlin highlighted the dangers in this, as past atrocities 
are a high risk factor in future atrocities, with genocide denial being a major 
contributing factor for genocide. However, Professor Alex Hinton questioned the 
validity of the argument that the institutionalisation of racism is a contributing factor 
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for the outbreak of mass atrocities and genocide; as such practices are present even 
in stable democratic countries such as the United States.  
 
The discussion then proceeded to the international community’s involvement in 
Libya. Dr Mayersen questioned whether the international community was willing to 
intervene due to a progression of mass atrocities, or whether it was merely 
undertaken due to Libya’s pariah status among the international community. 
Associate Professor Goldsmith asserted that this was a very complex issue with 
various contending views. One view is that the international community was so 
willing to intervene in order to deter other leaders from carrying out such mass 
atrocities.  Dr Luke Glanville voiced that the West became may have become 
involved in Libya due to the widespread media attention that was devoted to the 
rebels’ cause. In this sense, the international community was forced to intervene.  
 
Dr Mayersen then questioned the criteria for distinguishing rebels as military 
combatants from civilians in need of protection. In response, Mr Tay noted that from 
a legal perspective, there is not much distinction between lawful and unlawful 
combatants. Dr Mayersen suggested that this distinction becomes more important 
with regards to how rebels are portrayed by the government and the international 
media. For example, in Sri Lanka, the government was very effective in portraying 
the Tamil Tigers as militants, which deterred international intervention. In contrast, 
the international media was successful in portraying the rebels in Libya as civilians, 
which has made it easier for the international community to intervene on the basis 
of humanitarian considerations. Mr McLoughlin asserted that also highlights the 
dangers of perceiving R2P as a speech act as opposed to a policy agenda, as it implies 
distinctions that are not always present.  
 
Dr Mayersen then steered the discussion towards answering the question whether 
the intervention in Libya has reduced the risks of future mass atrocities, or whether 
it may prove irrelevant or even negative within the context of future intervention in 
situations of mass atrocities. Associate Professor Goldsmith contended that from a 
broad view of international relations, the decision by the UN Security Council to 
intervene and the reluctance of the US to lead the intervention, despite committing 
troops for the mission, suggests a major change.  In terms of practical international 
relations, he asserted that the intervention in Libya sends clear deterrence signals 
and offers potential that the US will get involved in the future at an earlier stage. 
However, Ms Gidley opposed this argument, by asserting that the reason why the 
international community was so willing to intervene was merely due to the scale of 
violence. She therefore argued that it was unlikely that the UN Security Council 
would get involved in future cases of mass atrocities if the same scale of violence is 
not present. 





10. Recommendations  
 
 
There was broad agreement that the issue of genocide and mass atrocity prevention 
in the Asia-Pacific region is extremely complex.  Nevertheless, there are 
opportunities for governments, civil society organisations and centres such as the 
Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect to promote actions that can 
reduce the risk of future mass atrocities in the region.  Reflecting on the roundtable 
discussion, the panel presentations and the panel discussions, and the theme of the 
workshop, participants agreed on the following recommendations:  
 
 Education programs in the Asia-Pacific region should be targeted at informing 
high school students, university students and the community about mass 
atrocities. They should also be used to encourage tolerance and create an 
understanding of a common humanity. 
 Skills related to conflict prevention should be in the central curriculum for 
school students. These include peer-mediation and critical examination of 
sources.  
 Civil society frameworks must be supported so that they can provide a means 
with which individuals can engage with issues associated with mass atrocity 
prevention. 
 At the state level, structural prevention measures must be pursued.  
 Fair and equal justice must be provided to prevent injustices escalating into 
violence or severe discrimination. Human rights violations must be answered 
by a legal framework capable of defending rights. 
 It is critical for international community to assist states in preventing mass 
atrocities and if this fails they must be prepared to intercede to defend the 
lives of civilians.  
Participants reflected that it was particularly valuable to bring an Asia-Pacific focus 
to the issue of genocide and mass atrocities.  There was a unique legacy of mass 
atrocities in our region, and very specific issues concerning transitional justice and 
reconciliation.  The region also faces unique challenges in preventing genocide and 
mass atrocities in the future.  It was hoped that there might be future opportunities 
to bring a regional focus to the issue following on from this workshop.  
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9.15-10.30am   









10.30am – 11am  Morning Tea  
 


















Panel One: Mass Violence in Indonesia and East Timor 
Chair: Dr Paul Bartrop 
 
East Timor: The Politics of Starvation 
Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes, UNSW@ADFA 
 
An Ongoing Legacy of Atrocity: Torture and the Indonesian State 
Annie Pohlman, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
Panel Two: Opportunities and Challenges for Mass Atrocity Prevention 
in the Asia-Pacific 
Chair: Associate Professor Ben Goldsmith 
 
Mediation in the Asia-Pacific: Constraints and Challenges 
Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw, University of South Australia 
 
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 
and Mass Atrocity Prevention in Southeast Asia 
Catherine Drummond, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect 
 
The Role of Stable Small States in the Responsibility to Protect  
Charles Tay, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 























3.15pm Exhibition Launch and Afternoon Tea 
Lessons from Rwanda: The United Nations and the Prevention of 
Genocide 
  United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI) 
 
4pm-5.30pm Public Lecture 
 
The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A View from Critical Transitional Justice 
Studies,  
 
Professor Alex Hinton, Director, Center for Genocide, Conflict 
Resolution and Human Rights, Rutgers University 
 
6.30pm Conference Dinner 
  ‘A Night in India’ 









Panel Three: Transitional Justice after Mass Atrocities 
Chair: Professor Alex Hinton 
 
Political Manipulation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia 
Rebecca Gidley, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect 
 
‘Maximising’ Transitional Justice Opportunities: The Case of East 
Timor’s CAVR 
Dr. Heather Castel, School of History, Philosophy, Religion and 
Classics, The University of Queensland 
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Panel Four: Early Warning and Prevention of Genocide and Mass 
Atrocities 
Chair: Associate Professor Dale Bagshaw 
 
Political Instability and Large-Scale Violence in the Economic North and 
South: Is the process different for richer and poorer societies?  
Dr Benjamin Goldsmith, University of Sydney 
Professor Arcot Sowmya, Dimitri Semenovich, University of NSW 
 
Understanding the Relationship between Risk and Resilience in the Long 
Term Prevention of Mass Atrocities: An Examination of Botswana and 
Zambia 
Stephen McLoughlin, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
 
Why Not Genocide?  Exploring Constraints that Inhibit Genocide Onset in 
at-risk Societies  
Dr Deborah Mayersen, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect  
 
Panel Five: The United Nations, Sovereignty and International Intervention 
in Mass Atrocity Crimes 
Chair: Associate Professor Clinton Fernandes 
 
Political Realism, Sovereignty and Intervention: Is Genocide Prevention 
Really Possible in a World of Sovereign States 
Dr Paul Bartrop, Bialik College 
 
The UN Security Council and Mass Atrocity Prevention: ‘Timely and 
Decisive’ Responses?  
Jess Gifkins, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
 
Averting Regime-Induced Displacement in the Asia-Pacific: Successes and 
Failures 
Dr Phil Orchard, School of Political Science and International Studies, UQ 
The University of Queensland 
 



































Roundtable: Mass Atrocities in the Asia-Pacific: Legacies and 
Prevention 
Co-facilitators: TBC 
In this roundtable, participants will be invited to consider a range of 
key questions concerning the legacies of mass atrocities in the Asia-
Pacific, and prospects for future prevention.   
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